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real. Conceivably, the plaintiff might go into the "business" of selling his broadcasting
privileges and consequently come into direct conflict with the defendant.24 Or, as was
alleged in the case, the effect of the broadcasting of the races might be to decrease the
attendance at the track.2s This result should warrant relief on the analogy of the trade-
name cases involving completely dissimilar goods.
There remains the question of how much of his own the defendant must add to
what he has taken from the plaintiff to make the product or result legally his. In the
instant case, it may be argued that the defendant transformed the mere observation
of the horse race into an exciting broadcast, embroidered with entertaining sidelights
and instructive interpretation. But this argument by analogy seems a most far-fetched
and hopeless justification for the defendant's appropriation and dissemination of the
plaintiff's show.
One final consideration remains. The result of protecting the plaintiff is to promote
his acquisition of future income by strengthening his monopoly of the means of ac-
quiring it. Since the ultimate purpose of protecting such monopoly is to encourage the
enterprise, the final decision may well turn on the social desirability of the plaintiff's
activity. In any event, a matter of such fundamental social importance might well be
left for the legislature.26
Trusts-Liability of Corporate Trustee-Court Order as a Defense to Trustee's
Liability-[Texas].-A corporation deposited securities with the defendant, trustee,
and issued participation certificates. The trust indenture contained an exculpatory
clause exempting the trustee from liability except for "gross negligence or wilful
default." Thereafter, a receiver was appointed for the settlor corporation and he on
behalf of go% of the trust beneficiaries, requested the receivership court to order the
defendant to deliver the securities to him. Accordingly, the decree was granted in
which it was also provided that the receiver should perform the duties of the original
trustee. The defendant, evidently knowing that not all the beneficiaries were repre-
sented, complied with the court order. Subsequently, the plaintiff, who was a certificate
holder, but not one of the go% represented by the receiver, filed suit for breach of trust
against the trustee. Held, the beneficiaries are necessary parties to a proceeding that
destroys the trust or materially alters its terms. Since the plaintiff was not a party in
the receivership court, the decree was no justification for the trustee's action. Nat'l
Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Bruce.,
The standards measuring the liabilities of a trustee under an indenture have not
been clearly defined by the decisions. Writers disagree on whether the standards ap-
plicable to the family trustee can be properly applied to the corporate trustee since the
24 In the United States, broadcasting and motion picture rights have become commercial
assets in both amateur and professional sports. Lit. Dig. 33 (Oct. 5, I935); Lit. Dig. 41 (Sept.
19, 1936); Phillips, Hold 'Em Mike, Sat. Eve. Post 25 (Oct. 17, 1936); Time 85 (Sept. 6, 1937).
2s Many colleges in the United States do not permit broadcasting of football games on the
theory that it cuts into the gate-receipts. Lit. Dig. 41 (Sept. ig, 1936).
26 See Brandeis, J., dissenting in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 248 (igi8); Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 17s, 1g (1936).
105 S.W. (2d) 882 (1937).
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latter's function is primarily that of bringing borrower and lender together.2 In some
respects, the two types of trustees are dissimilar: the trustee under an indenture may
conclusively rely upon disinterested expert opinion;3 notice to such a trustee is not
necessarily notice to the beneficiary;4 it may represent conflicting interests;S the trust
res usually remains in possession of the settlor. In some aspects, however, the trustee
under an indenture and the family trustee are alike in that neither, by the inclusion of
exculpatory clauses in their contracts, can escape the fundamental obligations inherent
in the trust. Thus, the trustee under an indenture probably has to record a mortgage;
it must not continue to issue bonds or certificates after knowledge of misapplication of
proceeds; it must comply with all prerequisites for authentication of bonds ;7 where
trustee has actual knowledge of default, it must notify the beneficiaries if protection of
the latter's interests necessitates notice.8
The trend in recent decisions is to remove the trustee under an indenture from the
position of a mere stakeholder to that of a fiduciary.9 There is'a growing hesitancy to
allow the exculpatory clause to immunize corporate trustees for failure to act when
protection of the beneficiaries' interests necessitates action. At most, the exculpatory
clause will probably serve only to relieve the trustee from the burden of constant
watchfulness; it will not immunize for inactivity after knowledge that inaction will
result in injury.1O In New York, for instance, there already has been legislation im-
posing greater duties and higher standards upon corporate trustees." In terms of fed-
eral regulation, the movement has reached its peak in the Barkley Bill now pending
in Congress, 2 of which some of the essential provisions are (a) the trustee's interests
shall not conflict with those of the beneficiaries except as provided, (b) the trustee shall
have active duties before default as well as after, (c) establishment of a standard of
liability measured by what the prudent man under similar circumstances would do,'3
2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 789 (r935); 2 Perry, Trusts § 76o (7th ed. 1929); Posner,
Liability of Trustee under the Corporate Indenture, 42 Harv. L. Rev. i98 (1929); Posner, The
Trustee and the Trust Indenture, 46 Yale L. J. 737 (1937); McCollom, S.E.C. and Corporate
Trustees, 36 Col. L. Rev. 1197 (1936).
3 Hunsberger v. Guaranty Trust Co., i5o N.Y. S. I9o (1914), aff'd 218 N.Y. 742, 113 N.E.
io58 (igi6); Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l. Bank, 59 Misc. 57 (1936) 287 N.Y. Supp. 541, semble;
Posner, 42 Harv. L. Rev. at 215 (X929); Barkley Bill, S 2344 75th Cong. ist Sess., § 7(i)
(trustee permitted to rely conclusively upon expert's opinion providing there is no bad faith
or gross negligence).
4 Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. v. B. R. T. Co., 291 Fed. 863 (S.D. N.Y. 1922).
s Posner, 42 Harv. L. Rev. at 229 (1929).
6 Posner, 42 Harv. L. Rev. at 2I (1929).
7Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat'l. Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930) (court im-
posed liability on rationale of negligent representation rather than on theory of a fiduciary re-
lationship); see note, 33 Col. L. Rev. 97 (933).
8 Marshall & Ilsley Bk. v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 25o N.W. 862 (Ig35).
9 See Marshall v. flsley Bk. v. Guaranty Inv. Co., supra, note 8. State v. Comer, 176
Wash. 257, 28 P. (2d) 1027 (1934); Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l. Bank, note 3 suepra, (where the
use of the term "trustee" in indentures was strongly condemned).
xo 46 Yale L. J. 871 (I937) and cases cited.
"Laws of x936, c. goo, adding a new Article §-A to the Real Property Law.
"Barkley Bill, op. ci. supra note 3. '3 Cf., Restat. Trusts § 174 (i935).
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(d) abolition of the exculpatory clause. The instant case fits into the general trend but
reaches an extreme position, since liability was imposed for compliance with a court
order.X4 The exculpatory clause gave no protection; yet because of such clause some
courts may have protected the trustee. But, the adoption of the Barkley Bill abolish-
ing the exculpatory clause, may but need not necessarily result in general imposition
of liability for compliance with void court orders.
When, upon advice of counsel, a family trustee complies with a decree which is
obvously void, liability will probably be imposed, even though such a trustee has
acted in good faith and exercised due care in selection of an advisor.Z5 It is questionable
whether the trustee under an indenture should have a greater obligation towards the
bondholders than to use reasonable care in the selection of counsel. Note that the
Barkley Bill allows the trustee, in absence of bad faith and gross negligence, to rely up-
on expert opinion concerning statements in the indenture. 6
Where, however, any kind of trustee complies with a court order, the validity of
which, as in the instant case, may be reasonably questioned, other considerations
enter. The trustee's position seems analogous to that of a public officer who acts under
an unconstitutional statute. The courts differ as to whether such officer should be
liable, but it is submitted that the better view is that which affords immunity. 7 The
trustee's position also seems similar to that of a sheriff who after seizing goods under a
process which is fair on its face, although prior proceedings have been unlawful, is
nevertheless protected. 8 To impose liability on a trustee even though compliance is
the result of reliance upon competent counsel would force a trustee to appeal from all
adverse decisions in trial courts. Thus, a trust estate could settle its litigation only at
a considerable cost in time and money. The result may also iend to encourage inaction
on part of trustees, or make them demand provisions for indemnity by the beneficiaries
who may be unable to find a willing surety or to finance the surety bond.
X4 It should be noted, however, that liability possibly may have been imposed because the
trustee did not inform the receivership court that some of the beneficiaries were unrepresented
in court.
IS Pierce v. Prescott, 128 Mass. i4o (i88o); (liability of guardian to ward); In re Ward's
Estate, 92 Conn. 286, 102 Atl. 586 (1917) (semble); Nat'l. Trust Co. v. Gen. Finance Co.,
[igos] A.C. 373; Bogert, 3 Trusts & Trustees, § 541 (1935).
x6 Barkley Bill § 7(i), op. cit. supra note 3.
'7 Peoplev. Salomon, 54111.39 (,870); Statev. Gardner ,54 Ohio St. 24,42 N.E. 999 (1896);
Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law 90-7 (2d ed. 1937); Crocker, Tort Liability of Public
Officers Who Act under Unconstitutional Statute, 2 So. Calif. L. Q. 236 (1929).
18 Mechem, Public Offices and Officers § 769 (i8go).
